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Denial outperforms apology in repairing organizational trust
despite strong evidence of guilt
Matteo Fuolia,b,⇤, Joost van de Weijerb and Carita Paradisb
aUniversity of Birmingham, United Kingdom
bLund University, Sweden
Abstract
Previous work in the areas of organizational trust repair and crisis communi-
cation has provided conflicting answers to the question of whether denial can be
more e↵ective than apology in repairing stakeholder trust in a company follow-
ing an integrity-based violation. This article reports the results of an experiment
designed to (i) test the e↵ects of these two strategies on individuals’ trust in a com-
pany accused of corruption, and (ii) determine whether and how evidence of the
company’s guilt influences stakeholder reactions to its trust repair message. The
results demonstrate that, when evidence against the company is weak, trust is re-
stored more successfully with a denial than an apology. Contrary to our hypothesis,
denial was found to outperform apology in repairing perceptions of the company’s
integrity and benevolence even in the face of strong evidence, and it was as e↵ective
as apology in restoring perceived ability and trusting intentions. These results pro-
vide empirical evidence for the ‘paradoxical e↵ect’ that an open and honest attitude
can, in the short term, be more detrimental to organizations than a defensive strat-
egy. More research on the factors that determine the credibility and persuasiveness
of corporate denial is called for.
Keywords: Organizational trust repair strategies, crisis communication, strength of
evidence, corporate denial, credibility, persuasion, manipulation, trust and culture
1 Introduction
Trust is a valuable relational asset for organizations, and an important precondition
for their legitimacy and long-term viability (e.g. Gillespie et al., 2014; Ingenho↵ and
Sommer, 2010; Pirson and Malhotra, 2011). But trust is also a fragile commodity; it
takes a long time to build, and just moments to destroy (Slovic, 1993). The past few
years have witnessed a number of examples of organizational trust failures – from the
Enron and WorldCom scandals in the early 2000s to the more recent JP Morgan, BP,
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and Volkswagen controversies. These and other events have contributed to creating a
climate of widespread distrust of business (e.g. Adams et al., 2010; Bachmann et al.,
2015; Kramer and Lewicki, 2010), which may hinder organizational success as well as
socio-economic development.
This situation has prompted a recent upsurge of scholarly interest in organizational
trust repair. Researchers working in this area seek to better understand how trust in
organizations can be restored after it has been violated, and to determine the most
appropriate strategies for companies to rebuild stakeholders’ trust in them following a
crisis (Bachmann et al., 2015; Eberl et al., 2015; Gillespie and Dietz, 2009; Gillespie et al.,
2014; Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan, 2009; Kramer and Lewicki, 2010; Pfarrer et al.,
2008; Poppo and Schepker, 2010). One issue that has attracted considerable attention
and some controversy in the literature concerns the e↵ects and appropriateness of two
basic response strategies that are commonly used by organizations in situations where
trust is at stake, namely apology and denial (Gillespie et al., 2014: 400).
Studies adopting a normative approach emphasize the importance of openness and
transparency in the process of organizational trust repair, and caution against the risks
of a defensive response to alleged wrongdoing (Gillespie and Dietz, 2009; Gillespie et al.,
2014; Pfarrer et al., 2008). According to this perspective, accepting responsibility and
apologizing for the violation are necessary steps towards organizational trust repair.
Conversely, denial can be used as a means of obfuscating the truth and may therefore
inhibit this process. This view is supported by research in the neighboring field of crisis
communication, where, as noted by Coombs and Holladay (2008: 253), apology has
generally been regarded as the best strategy for restoring a company’s image.
However, experimental studies on interpersonal trust repair have consistently found
that, in certain situations, apologizing leads to a greater loss of trust than denying (Ferrin
et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2013, 2004). While apology has been shown to be more e↵ective
than denial in the case of competence-related violations, where the alleged breach of
trust is attributed to the trust breaker’s lack of adequate skills, denial has been found to
be comparatively more e↵ective in response to integrity-based violations, that is, when
the trusted person is accused of having abused the other party’s trust deliberately for
personal gain. In such cases, people seem to be inclined to give the accused party the
benefit of the doubt.
The apparent discrepancy between the findings from crisis communication and in-
terpersonal trust repair studies may, at least in part, be due to a factor that has not
previously been considered, but that may have a significant influence on individuals’
reaction to organizational messages in situations where trust is at stake, namely the per-
ceived strength of the evidence against the company (Gillespie et al., 2014: 400). In this
study, experimental methods are used to investigate (i) whether denial is more e↵ective
than apology in repairing organizational trust following an alleged integrity-based vio-
lation, and (ii) whether and how evidence of the company’s guilt influences stakeholder
reactions to its trust repair message. The study focuses on short-term stakeholder re-
actions in the immediate aftermath of a crisis event, when the level of uncertainty and
public scrutiny of a company’s actions and communications is highest (Dardis and Haigh,
2
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
2009: 101).
By tackling the questions above, this study seeks to contribute to the current debate
regarding optimal organizational trust repair strategies and, ultimately, to advance our
understanding of the process of trust repair in the context of company–stakeholder rela-
tionships. Empirically testing the hypothesis of whether denial is more persuasive than
apology following alleged integrity-based violations is particularly important, not only
for settling the above-mentioned academic dispute, but also for a critical evaluation of
currently widespread crisis communication practices. Since denial is among the response
strategies that are most frequently used by companies (Kim et al., 2009), and given the
fact that it can serve as a tool for obfuscating the truth and evading responsibility, it is
crucial to assess its communicative e↵ectiveness. By considering the role played by the
evidence of the company’s guilt, we address an as yet unexplored variable that may be
important in determining how trust in organizations is best repaired after it has been
violated.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 Organizational trust
Following Rousseau et al. (1998: 395), trust can be defined as “a psychological state
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the
intentions or behavior of another”. While trust always originates from individuals, the
target of trust may be either another person or an organization (Zaheer et al., 1998).
In this study we focus on stakeholder trust in organizations. In this context, then,
individual stakeholders are the trustors, who make themselves vulnerable to the actions
of an organization based on positive expectations (Pirson and Malhotra, 2011).
Trust involves risk and vulnerability as our ability to infer other people’s intentions
and anticipate their actions is limited, and trusted parties may abuse their position of
trust for personal gain (Mayer et al., 1995). When we trust others, we do so in the
belief that they will act in a way that is “beneficial or at least not detrimental to us”
(Gambetta, 1988: 4). This belief, in turn, hinges upon our assessment of the other
party’s trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995). Trust and trustworthiness are two related
yet distinct notions. Trustworthiness is a crucial antecedent of trust; it underpins positive
expectations towards the trusted party and provides a basis for trusting them (Mayer
et al., 1995).
Based on the above distinction, we can divide the concept of trust into two fundamen-
tal, interrelated components: (i) trusting intentions and (ii) trusting beliefs (McKnight
et al., 1998). Trusting intentions concern trustors’ willingness to make themselves vul-
nerable to the actions of another person or organization in a situation involving risk.
Trusting beliefs, on the other hand, are trustors’ perceptions of the other party’s trust-
worthiness. Trusting beliefs inform and influence individuals’ trusting intentions. Thus,
the more trustworthy people or companies appear to be, the more willing the trustor
will be to trust them, and engage in risk-taking behavior.
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Trusting beliefs are formed on the basis of the trustor’s assessment of the other
party’s trustworthiness against three main criteria: (i) ability, (ii) benevolence, and
(iii) integrity (Mayer et al., 1995). In the context of company–stakeholder relations,
ability1 concerns the collective competencies that enable an organization to meet its
goals and responsibilities in an e↵ective and reliable manner. Benevolence refers to the
organization’s care and genuine concern for the well-being of its stakeholders. Integrity
relates to its adherence to socially accepted moral principles, such as honesty, fairness,
and sincerity (Gillespie and Dietz, 2009: 128). These three aspects of trustworthiness
are interrelated but separable, and may vary independently of each other (Mayer et al.,
1995). Their relative importance depends on the context and the relationship (Mayer
and Davis, 1999); in fact, di↵erent stakeholder groups have been shown to prioritize
di↵erent components of trustworthiness based on the type of vulnerabilities they face
(Pirson and Malhotra, 2011).
2.2 Trust violation and repair
Trust is a dynamic construct that changes over time as social relationships evolve (e.g.
Cook, 2001; Mayer et al., 1995; Saunders et al., 2010). The outcomes of risk-taking in a
relationship influence the trustor’s impressions of the other party’s trustworthiness and,
accordingly, the amount of trust s/he has in the trustee (Mayer et al., 1995). Thus, trust
is strengthened when risk-taking acts lead to the expected results. It is jeopardized when
the trusted party’s behavior violates the trustor’s positive expectations (Lewicki, 2006:
107). Notably, not only manifest acts, but also simple allegations may be su cient to
undermine trust (e.g. Bell and Loftus, 1989; Kim et al., 2004; Kim and Harmon, 2014).
Di↵erent acts of trust violation may generate di↵erent attributions. Following Kim
et al. (2004), a distinction can be made between competence-based violations, when
the trust breaker’s behavior calls his or her ability into question, and of integrity-based
violations, when the breach of trust is attributed to the lack of moral integrity. An
accounting error, for example, may damage perceptions of the accountant’s ability if
attributed to his or her inadequate knowledge of tax codes, or it may harm perceptions
of his or her integrity if understood as an intentional attempt to deceive others (Kim
et al., 2004). But the trustee’s actions may also undermine perceptions of his or her
benevolence when interpreted as evidence of disregard for the trustor’s wellbeing and
interests. This applies to both interpersonal and company–stakeholder relationships.
Fuoli and Paradis (2014), for instance, illustrate how, following the Gulf of Mexico oil
spill of 2010, the benevolence of the oil company BP was damaged, among other things,
by the faux pas made by the former CEO, Tony Hayward. As the authors explain, Tony
Hayward’s infamous ‘I want my life back’ comment made in an interview in the aftermath
of the spill suggested that the CEO and, by extension, BP placed other priorities ahead of
solving the crisis and supporting the people a↵ected by it (Fuoli and Paradis, 2014: 57).
Clearly, trust violations may push the trustor to question more than one aspect of the
other party’s trustworthiness. Trust-breaking acts, in particular in the case of complex
corporate crises, may carry broad implications, and may cast doubts on a company’s
ability, benevolence, and integrity.
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In order to repair trust following a perceived violation, the trust breaker will need to
take remedial actions aimed at improving the trusting beliefs and intentions of the trustor
(Kim et al., 2004: 105). Communication is a fundamental means through which trust
repair attempts are carried out. It plays a particularly important role in organizational
trust repair, given the relative unobservability of companies’ behavior (Fuoli and Paradis,
2014). Apology and denial are two of the most basic and common verbal trust repair
strategies (Kim et al., 2004). In the next section, we review prior studies that have
investigated the e↵ects of these strategies in situations where trust is at stake.
2.3 Apology and denial as trust repair strategies
One critical decision that organizations need to make when publicly responding to a
crisis is whether to apologize or deny responsibility for it (Poppo and Schepker, 2010:
135). Following Kim et al. (2004), apology is defined here as a statement whereby
the accused party acknowledges responsibility for a violation, and expresses regret for
it. Conversely, denial is defined as a statement by means of which the accused party
explicitly declares the allegation to be untrue and thus disclaims responsibility for it
(Kim et al., 2004).2 Apology and denial lie at opposite ends of a continuum ranging
from accommodative to defensive response strategies that companies can use to address
crisis situations (Coombs, 1998). Strategies at the accommodative end of the continuum
seek to build a positive organizational image by addressing victim concerns, whereas
those at the defensive end aim to protect the company’s image by denying or shifting
blame (Coombs and Schmidt, 2000).
Previous work in both the domains of organizational trust repair and crisis communi-
cation has emphasized the positive role of apology in improving stakeholders’ impressions
of a company following a crisis (e.g. Coombs, 2007; Fuchs-Burnett, 2002; Gillespie and
Dietz, 2009; Gillespie et al., 2014; Pace et al., 2010; Pfarrer et al., 2008). An apology
signals redemption (Ferrin et al., 2007); it suggests that the company has learned its les-
son and is committed to avoid similar violations in the future (Gillespie and Dietz, 2009;
Gillespie et al., 2014). Further, an apology demonstrates the company’s integrity and
concern for those a↵ected by the crisis (Gillespie and Dietz, 2009; Gillespie et al., 2014).
It can thus help to soothe people’s anger and influence their opinions in a more positive
direction (Coombs and Holladay, 2005; Coombs, 2007). In contrast, a denial indicates
that there is no need to rectify the organization’s behavior (Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim et al.,
2004; Poppo and Schepker, 2010). This can generate uncertainty about the company’s
future conduct, particularly when its innocence has not been clearly established (Kim
et al., 2004). A denial may even lead the crisis to escalate as it leaves important questions
unanswered and frustrates people’s need to understand what happened (Gillespie et al.,
2014). In addition, unlike apology, a denial ignores the needs of the victims and signals
no compassion for them (Coombs, 1999: 129). For these reasons, the denial strategy is
only prescribed for responding to rumors and unfair challenges (Coombs, 2007).
This emphasis on the positive e↵ects of apology appears to be at odds with empir-
ical findings on trust repair in interpersonal relations. Recent studies have repeatedly
demonstrated that the e↵ectiveness of apology and denial in repairing trust between in-
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dividuals is contingent upon the type of violation the trust breaker is accused of having
committed (Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2013, 2004). Apology has been shown to be
more e↵ective than denial in cases of competence-related violations; conversely, denial
has been found to be comparatively more e↵ective for violations concerning matters of
integrity (Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2013, 2004). This e↵ect can be explained by
the fact that individuals tend to put more weight on positive information about compe-
tence than on negative information about competence, but conversely, they tend to put
more weight on negative information about integrity than on positive information about
integrity (Madon et al., 1997; Martijn et al., 1992; Kim et al., 2004; see also Snyder and
Stukas, 1999 for a review). Thus, one single poor performance is typically not taken
as a sign of incompetence, but one single act of dishonesty is generally considered as a
reliable indication of low integrity (Kim et al., 2004: 106; Reeder and Brewer, 1979).
Whether the e↵ects observed by Kim and colleagues in the context of dyadic in-
terpersonal relationships apply to company–stakeholder relationships in the same way
remains an open question, however. Previous studies on organizational trust repair that
have addressed the issue of how companies should respond to trust failures are either
purely theoretical (Gillespie and Dietz, 2009; Pfarrer et al., 2008; Poppo and Schep-
ker, 2010), or qualitative and based on a single case study (Gillespie et al., 2014). In
crisis communication research, there have been a number of experimental studies in-
vestigating the comparative e↵ectiveness of di↵erent crisis response strategies, including
apology and denial. Except for two studies that found no significant di↵erences between
these two strategies (Coombs and Schmidt, 2000; Lyon and Cameron, 1998), previous
experiments show that apology outperforms denial in repairing a company’s image in
the wake of a crisis (Bradford and Garrett, 1995; Dardis and Haigh, 2009; Decker, 2012;
Lee, 2005; Lyon and Cameron, 2004; McDonald et al., 2010). However, these studies
mainly focus on corporate image or reputation, rather than trust. Although related,
trust is conceptually distinct from both image and reputation.3 Crucially, trust involves
both a perceptual dimension and an intentional dimension. Image and reputation are
important perceptual antecedents of trust, in the sense that if a company has a positive
image or reputation, stakeholders will be more inclined to engage in risk-taking behav-
ior and make themselves vulnerable to the organizations’ actions (van Der Merwe and
Puth, 2014). However, image and reputation lack the intentional dimension. From a
conceptual point of view, then, they are closer to trustworthiness than to trust. Where
trust is considered in previous work, fairly simplistic models that are not based on the
work on organizational trust reviewed are used. The scales employed by both Lee (2005)
and Decker (2012) do not account for individuals’ trusting intentions; they only mea-
sure certain aspects of perceived trustworthiness. The same consideration applies to the
trust scale developed by Hon and Grunig (1999), which is widely used in public relations
studies. Therefore, the extent to which the findings of these studies may be generalized
to the case of organizational trust repair is unclear. Also, no explicit distinction is made
between ability- and integrity-based violations. In fact, most of the studies referenced
above are based on accidental crisis scenarios, rather than instances of deliberate cor-
porate wrongdoing. If we equate accidental crises with competence-based violations,
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then the fact that apology outperforms denial is actually compatible with Kim and col-
leagues’ findings. Moreover, organizational responses are operationalized in inconsistent
ways, and often combine multiple verbal strategies, such as for instance denial and blame
shifting in Dardis and Haigh (2009). These inconsistencies make it hard to isolate and
compare the e↵ects of apology and denial across di↵erent studies, because it is unclear
whether the observed e↵ects should be attributed to the apology or denial as such, to
the accompanying strategies, or to the specific combination of responses used.
In addition to the above, in the scenarios used in previous crisis communication
experiments, the accused company generally has limited room for deniability, given
that some physical evidence indicating that it actually was responsible for the crisis
is available. Lee (2005) and McDonald et al. (2010), for example, are both based on a
plane crash scenario. In a situation of this kind, it is not possible for the airline company
to deny that the accident occurred, and it would arguably be di cult for them to disclaim
responsibility altogether. Other studies focus on product-recall crises, where room for
deniability is limited by the fact that some of the products from the accused company
have been found to be faulty (e.g. Bradford and Garrett, 1995; Dardis and Haigh, 2009;
Decker, 2012). This clash between corporate response and available evidence may limit
the e↵ectiveness of denial. This hypothesis is further explored in the next section.
2.4 Strength of evidence
When a company admits to and apologizes for wrongdoing, no doubts are left regarding
its guilt. The apology itself counts as conclusive evidence of culpability, and may even be
used in lawsuits against the organization (Myers, 2016). But when a company denies,
the onus is on the public to decide whether it can actually be trusted or not. Thus,
the e↵ectiveness of a denial hinges upon people’s assessment of its credibility. Although
several factors may a↵ect individuals’ judgments of the credibility of the denial, including
the company’s prior reputation and crisis history (cf. Coombs, 2007), we propose that a
crucial one is the strength of the evidence on which the accusation is based.
Previous work has paid very little attention to the role evidence plays in moderating
the e↵ects of corporate crisis response strategies. As discussed above, many of previous
experimental studies in the domain of crisis communication are based on scenarios where
some physical evidence of the company’s responsibility exists (e.g. Dardis and Haigh,
2009; Decker, 2012; Lee, 2005; McDonald et al., 2010). The potential implications of
this fact, however, are not addressed. Similarly, in an experiment on image repair in
interpersonal relationships conducted by Benoit and Drew (1997), apology was found to
outperform denial, but the participants were informed in the scenario description that
the other party did indeed commit the act s/he was accused of. In a situation like that,
where evidence of guilt is simply unequivocal, the accused person has virtually no room
for denying the accusations, and any attempt to do so will arguably be perceived as
insincere or inappropriate. Benoit and Drew (1997), however, do not comment on this
issue.
In a theoretical contribution, Coombs (1995) touches upon the topic of evidence.
The author’s treatment of evidence, however, is limited in two main respects. First,
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it does not address the issue of how perceived veracity of evidence a↵ects individuals’
reactions to companies’ crisis response messages. It only provides normative guidelines
for how companies should handle di↵erent crisis situations. Second, the author’s con-
ceptualization of evidence as either true or false, with ambiguous evidence restricted to
cases of faux pas, does not seem to adequately reflect the reality of most crisis situations.
In fact, it is hardly ever the case that there are no doubts about a company’s innocence
or guilt. More often than not, evidence is scant and conflicting. Evidence gradually
emerges as the crisis unfolds. It usually takes a long time before the truth about what
happened is revealed, and responsible parties are conclusively identified. Accordingly,
rather than treating evidence as either true or false, it seems more reasonable to consider
it as a continuous variable ranging from weak to strong. This is the approach taken in
the present study.
Gri n et al. (1991) provide some empirically grounded insights into how strength
of evidence might a↵ect people’s perceptions of a company’s trustworthiness following
alleged wrongdoing. The authors do not consider strength of evidence as such, but
investigate the closely related aspect of source credibility, that is, the degree to which
the message source is considered competent and truthful by the receiver (Sternthal et al.,
1978). Gri n et al. (1991) show that, when the negative publicity is attributed to a
low credibility source, individuals exhibit more positive attitudes towards the company
accused of being responsible for the poisoning than when the news is attributed to a
highly credible source. In light of these findings and based on the assumption that
evidence supplied by a highly credible source will be perceived as more compelling than
that presented by a less credible source, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that strong
evidence will result in a lower degree of trust in the accused company compared to weak
evidence.
But how does strength of evidence a↵ect individuals’ reaction to the accused com-
pany’s trust repair message? Is denial equally (in)e↵ective in case of weak and strong
evidence? And what about apology? Bradford and Garrett (1995) hypothesize that
denial is the most e↵ective strategy for restoring a company’s image when no evidence
of its guilt is available, whereas apology is the optimal response in cases where there
is unequivocal evidence of the company’s blameworthiness. This hypothesis is based
on the idea that stakeholders will give the organization the benefit of the doubt, if the
accusing party or the accusations are not credible, but will reject the company’s denial
as unconvincing and deceitful, if there is undisputable evidence against it (Bradford
and Garrett, 1995: 879). The results of the experiment, however, only partly confirm
the authors’ hypothesis. Where no evidence of the company’s responsibility was given,
apology was found to be the best strategy, even though denial had a mildly positive
e↵ect on perceptions of the company’s image as well. When irrefutable evidence against
the company was provided, denial was found to be damaging to the company’s image,
although excuses yielded even lower ratings.
Retrospectively, however, the reason why Bradford and Garrett’s (1995) original
hypothesis was not fully confirmed might be explained by the fact that the scenario
considered is a product-safety incident. Given the unintentional nature of the act, the
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company’s failure may primarily have been attributed to its lack of competence, rather
than integrity. If that is the case, apology can indeed be expected to be more e↵ective
than denial, as argued above. But the comparatively greater e↵ectiveness of apology
across the experimental conditions may also have been due to the fact that the company’s
denial, as presented in the stimulus material, was considerably more concise and less
sympathetic than its apology. The apology text also included additional information
that may have swayed the participants’ opinion, such as the fact that the company
pledged to pay the medical bills for the drug related illnesses, or that it was under the
impression that all hospitals were informed of the need to test the patient’s blood before
administering the drug (Bradford and Garrett, 1995: 889–890). In sum, while insightful,
the results of Bradford and Garrett (1995) study do not provide a conclusive answer to
the question of how strength of evidence a↵ects the e↵ectiveness of apology and denial
in repairing organizational trust after alleged integrity-based violations.
Although it is not considered as an experimental variable, evidence is an implicit
component of the experimental design used by Kim et al. (2004). The authors examine
the comparative e↵ects of apology and denial on interpersonal trust both in the absence
of reliable evidence of the accused party’s guilt, in which case the allegations are pre-
sented as based on hearsay, and in the face of irrefutable evidence of their culpability,
ratified in an o cial ruling by a government agency. As detailed above, Kim et al. (2004)
found that, when no evidence of guilt was available, denial was more e↵ective than apol-
ogy following integrity-related violations. However, when the accused party denied a
violation, but his or her guilt was subsequently proven, the resulting level of trust was
lower than if s/he had initially admitted culpability. That is, when the trust breaker’s
denial was contradicted by subsequent evidence, the positive e↵ects of this strategy were
nullified.
In Kim et al.’s (2004) study, the trust breaker’s response and the moment when his
or her guilt or innocence is revealed are sequential in time. First, participants were
exposed to the trust breaker’s response in a situation where evidence of guilt was still
unclear. Only afterwards were they informed about whether the accused person actually
committed the o↵ense or not. In addition, the truth about what happened was presented
as indisputable and conclusive as the accused party’s guilt or innocence was determined
by a legally binding verdict. The participants were thus able to easily compare the trust
breaker’s ‘version of the story’ with the ‘real story’, and evaluate whether the accused
party’s initial response was sincere or not. This situation is di↵erent from the one under
investigation here, where individuals evaluate the company’s response at the same time
as they assess the strength of the evidence against it, and where evidence is presented
as either weak or strong, rather than weak or conclusive. This type of scenario seems to
more accurately reflect the reality of most organizational crises, especially in the early
phases.
Despite this di↵erence, Kim et al.’s (2004) results provide a solid basis for mak-
ing predictions about the e↵ects of strength of evidence on individuals’ reactions to a
company’s apology and denial. In line with Kim et al. (2004), we expect denial to
be comparatively more e↵ective than apology in repairing organizational trust after an
9
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alleged integrity-based violation only when weak evidence of the company’s guilt is avail-
able. Conversely, when there is strong evidence of the organization’s blameworthiness,
we expect apology to be the more e↵ective strategy on the grounds that a denial in the
face of strong evidence of guilt would be perceived as insincere, and as a deliberate at-
tempt at deception. These predictions, which are coherent with Bradford and Garrett’s
(1995) initial hypotheses, are formally presented below.
2.5 General distrust of corporations
In addition to the type of violation committed, the organization’s response, and the
strength of the evidence against it, yet another important factor that can be expected to
influence individuals’ trust in a company after alleged wrongdoing is their overall degree
of trust in corporations as a collective. As noted at the outset, public trust in business
has been shaken by a long series of widely publicized cases of corporate wrongdoing.
These events have contributed to an increase in public distrust of corporations (Adams
et al., 2010). Distrust in business is spread through institutionalized narratives that tend
to be overwhelmingly negative and to reinforce stereotypes of corporations as “amoral
entities that will do almost anything to increase profits – including lie, cheat and steal
if need be” (Harris and Wicks, 2010: 152). These beliefs may play an important part in
shaping people’s impressions of individual organizations (Adams et al., 2010). This is
particularly likely in situations where limited information about the company is available.
As McKnight et al. (1998) observe, where there is limited mutual knowledge and history
of interaction, parties in a trust relationship tend to rely more heavily on cognitive cues
arising from reputations and stereotypes. Therefore, it is important that individual
biases against corporations in general are controlled for when measuring people’s trust
in a specific organization. Accordingly, in this study we treat distrust in corporations as
a control variable. Details about how this factor was operationalized and measured are
provided below.
3 Hypotheses
As the above discussion has shown, previous work has provided conflicting answers to
the question of whether denial is more e↵ective than apology in repairing organizational
trust after integrity-based violations. Organizational trust and crisis communication
studies have generally found apology to be a comparatively more e↵ective and appropri-
ate communicative strategy following a corporate crisis. However, these studies mainly
focus on corporate image or reputation, they do not properly account for the nature
of the trust violation committed, i.e. ability-based versus integrity-based, and they are
mostly based on scenarios where the accused company has limited room for deniability.
Studies on interpersonal trust repair, on the other hand, have consistently shown that
denial outperforms apology in repairing trust following integrity-based violations.
Given the robustness of the findings reported in interpersonal trust repair studies, we
use them as the basis for the development of our hypotheses. We hypothesize that denial
10
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
will be more e↵ective than apology in repairing trust in a company following integrity-
based violations. However, as discussed above, we expect the strength of the evidence
against the company to play a key role in moderating the e↵ects of these two strategies.
Thus, we expect the e↵ectiveness of denial vis-a´-vis apology to vary depending on the
degree of strength of the evidence of the company’s guilt, so that denial will be more
e↵ective in repairing organizational trust only in situations where there is weak evidence
of the company’s guilt. But, in cases where there is strong evidence, apology will be
comparatively more e↵ective because a denial in the face of strong evidence of guilt
will be perceived as intentionally deceitful. Based on this reasoning, we formulate our
hypotheses as follows.
Hypothesis 1: When evidence against the company is weak, individuals will display
more trust in the accused company if the company responds with a denial rather
than an apology.
Hypothesis 2: When evidence against the company is strong, individuals will dis-
play more trust in the accused company if the company responds with an apology
rather than a denial.
These two hypotheses were tested in a scenario-based experiment, which is described
in the following sections.
4 Method
To test the hypotheses described above, and determine the e↵ects of trust repair strategy
and strength of evidence on organizational trust following an alleged integrity-based
violation, a scenario-based experiment was conducted. The experiment involved a 2x2
between-subjects design with company response (apology vs. denial) and strength of
evidence (weak vs. strong) as factors. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
the four experimental conditions.
4.1 Participants
Participants were 284 undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in a variety of busi-
ness management, organizational behavior, and economics courses at Lund University in
Sweden. Responses of two participants were excluded due to incompleteness, leaving a
total of 282 valid questionnaires. Fifty-four percent of the final sample was female, and
age ranged from 18 to 52 (M = 22.94, SD = 3.72). The vast majority of the participants
(78%) were of Swedish nationality, and the remaining 22% represented other nationali-
ties. To encourage and reward participation, respondents were o↵ered the opportunity
to enter a lottery for five movie tickets.
4.2 Procedure
The questionnaire was administered during class. Participants were given a paper-and-
pencil experimental packet that included instructions, stimulus materials, dependent
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measures, manipulation check items, and demographic questions. They were informed
in the instructions that participation in the study was voluntary, that the questionnaire
was anonymous, and that by responding to the survey they were giving their consent for
their data to be used for the purposes of the study. Completing the questionnaire took
approximately 20 minutes, after which the participants were debriefed and thanked for
their participation.
4.3 Experimental task
The task the participants were asked to carry out comprised four steps. First, they read
a short text providing basic background information about Renergi, a fictitious Swedish
multinational energy corporation headquartered in Stockholm. The background text
presented Renergi as a large and successful company, whose business had grown sub-
stantially over the past fifteen years. The text was the same across all experimental
conditions. Second, participants read a fabricated newspaper article about a case of
suspected international corruption involving Renergi. The article reported on the al-
legations and included the manipulation of strength of evidence. The news story was
loosely modeled after the corruption scandal that struck Siemens AG in the early 2000s
(for an overview of the case, see Eberl et al., 2015). In short, the article reported that
several Renergi executives were suspected of having bribed public o cials to secure lucra-
tive contracts abroad. Allegedly, the executives accused of paying bribes were following
company instructions rather than acting on their own initiative. Third, participants
read a second newspaper article, dated two days after the first one, published by the
same newspaper. This included both the manipulation of company response as well as
the manipulation of strength of evidence. After reading the background text and both
articles, the participants completed a questionnaire designed to measure their trust in
Renergi. Details about the measures used are provided below.
An imaginary company name was used in order to prevent previous knowledge of,
and attitudes towards, the company from a↵ecting the participants’ responses in id-
iosyncratic ways. Similarly, the background text aimed to provide every participant
with standardized information about the company, so as to control for their individual
biases. A Swedish company was chosen in order to make the news story as relevant
as possible to the participants in the study. A corruption scenario was chosen because
it represents a prototypical case of integrity-based violation (Eberl et al., 2015), where
the company deliberately breaks shared social norms (encapsulated in laws) for its own
benefit. The articles were formatted to resemble real newspaper articles in order to make
them seem plausible and natural.
4.4 Manipulations
Two versions of the first newspaper article and four of the second one were created
to generate the stimuli for the four experimental conditions of this study. The bulk
of each version of the two articles was identical, except for the parts containing the
manipulations. All versions of the articles are available as Supplementary Materials.
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Strength of evidence was manipulated by varying parts of the text of both articles
as well as the image accompanying the first article. In the weak evidence version of
the first article, the allegations against Renergi were presented as unproven, given that
o cial investigations were still underway, and that all alleged recipients of the bribes
had denied receiving money from the company. The article featured a generic picture
of a solar power plant built by Renergi in India. In the strong evidence version of the
first article, the accusations against Renergi were presented as substantiated by hidden-
camera footage showing an Indian government o cial accepting a bribe from a Renergi
executive. The text was accompanied by a still frame from the hidden-camera footage.
The second newspaper article also included a sentence that framed the evidence against
the company as either weak or strong.
Company response was manipulated by changing both the headline and the body of
the text of the second article. The article reported Renergi’s o cial statement about the
allegations of corruption. The company either admitted to and apologized for bribing
foreign o cials, or denied the accusations completely.
Prior to the experiment, the stimulus materials were iteratively tested on informants
and progressively developed to ensure that the manipulations were as e↵ective as possi-
ble, and that the articles were perceived as realistic and easy to read.
4.5 Measures
Trust in Renergi was measured using several multi-item scales adapted from previous
studies on organizational trust and interpersonal trust repair. The scales assessed dif-
ferent aspects of trust, based on the model outlined above. Thus, two core components
of this construct were measured: trusting intentions and trusting beliefs. Trusting be-
liefs encompassed perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity. Trusting intentions were
measured using three items adapted from the ‘willingness to risk’ scale used by Kim
et al. (2004). Perceived ability was measured using two items adapted from Kim et al.
(2004) and one item adapted from Xie and Peng (2009). Perceived benevolence was
measured using two items adapted from Mayer and Davis (1999) and one item adapted
from Rawlins (2008). Perceived integrity was assessed with three items adapted from
Kim et al. (2004). In order to control for individual biases, the questionnaire also mea-
sured participants’ attitudes towards corporations in general. To this end, four items
adapted from the corporate distrust scale developed by Adams et al. (2010) were used.
Those items, from the original twelve-item scale, that appeared to be the most relevant
to the scenario considered here were selected. The questionnaire also included three ma-
nipulation checks, tapping into participants’ perceptions of the strength of the evidence,
of the company’s confession of guilt, and of the plausibility of the articles. The item
for perceived strength of evidence was presented immediately after the first newspaper
article in order to prevent the company response from a↵ecting participants’ assessment.
As noted above, the company’s apology might have been taken as prima facie evidence
of guilt. The other manipulation checks were presented after the second newspaper
article. Participants were instructed not to read the articles again before answering
the comprehension check questions. Participants responded to all items included in the
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Table 1. Variable means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and intercorrelations.
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4
(1) Perceived ability 3.67 1.20 .83
(2) Perceived benevolence 3.01 1.10 .88 .29*
(3) Perceived integrity 2.91 1.27 .88 .44* .56*
(4) Trusting intentions 2.66 1.05 .67 .24* .24* .39*
(5) Distrust in corporations 3.99 1.40 .88 .11 -.06 -.02 -.15*
* p < .05
questionnaire on 7-point Likert scales with endpoints ranging from “strongly disagree”
(1) to “strongly agree” (7). All the scales and items used are reported in the Appendix.
5 Results
5.1 Reliabilities
As shown in Table 1, the reliability coe cients for all the multi-item scales used in the
study were above acceptable levels, based on DeVellis (2012: 109). All but one of the
scores exceeded the .80 threshold, indicating very good reliability. Even though the alpha
coe cient for the ‘trusting intentions’ scale was lower than that for the other scales, it
was comparable to the value reported in Kim et al. (2004: 109) for the equivalent scale,
i.e. ↵ = .69, and higher than that reported in Kim et al. (2006: 57), i.e. ↵ = .53. It was
also higher than the coe cient reported in Mayer and Davis (1999: 128) for the ‘trust’
scale from which Kim et al. (2004) ‘willingness to risk’ scale was originally derived, i.e.
↵ = .60.
5.2 Convergent and discriminant validity
We conducted a factor analysis on the questionnaire items, presupposing five factors.
Table 2 shows correlations (loadings, after varimax rotation) between the 16 items and
the five factors. Sizeable correlations (larger than .40) are marked in boldface. They
show that each of the five item sets strongly correlates with one, and only one, of the
factors. Each of the five factors accounted for at least 10% of the total variance in the
scores and jointly they accounted for 65%. A significant lack of fit (p < .05) of the five-
factor model suggested the addition of a sixth factor. However, this addition did not
substantially change the pattern shown in Table 2. Moreover, the sixth factor accounted
for less than five percent of the variance in the scores, from which we conclude that the
five-factor model was satisfactory for the present purposes.
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Table 2. Item loadings for the five-factor model. Loadings larger than .40 are in bold.
Factors 1 to 5 correspond to the dimensions ‘distrust in corporations’, ‘perceived benev-
olence’, ‘perceived ability’, ‘perceived integrity’ and ‘trusting intentions’, respectively.
Item Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5
q5 .032 .038 .765 .096 .016
q6 .107 .172 .878 .144 .072
q7 .069 .154 .624 .219 .252
q8 .029 .768 .137 .210 .101
q9 -.090 .868 .067 .188 .053
q10 -.047 .757 .150 .265 .127
q11 .026 .309 .322 .556 .264
q12 -.036 .272 .136 .836 .170
q13 .013 .327 .214 .800 .189
q14 -.004 .085 .032 .139 .816
q15 -.108 .041 .108 .065 .667
q16 -.119 .116 .100 .214 .403
q17 .767 -.081 .068 -.035 .020
q18 .782 -.061 .046 -.006 -.132
q19 .815 .029 -.014 .048 -.082
q20 .829 .021 .093 -.032 -.063
5.3 Manipulation checks
Manipulation checks revealed that the experimental manipulations were successful. As
expected, respondents in the apology condition gave significantly higher agreement rat-
ings to the statement ‘Renergi has admitted to having bribed public o cials to win
contracts abroad’ than participants in the denial condition (t = 25.004, df = 263.96, p <
.001). Further, participants in the strong evidence condition rated evidence against
the company as significantly stronger than participants in the weak evidence condition
(t = 11.242, df = 278.35, p < .001). On average, participants judged the articles to be
fairly realistic (M = 4.69, SD = 1.38).
5.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports overall mean values, reliabilities, and inter-correlations of the dependent
variables used in the study. Variable means, standard deviations, and number of obser-
vations by condition appear in Table 3. Variable means are also displayed graphically
in Figure 1.
15
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
5.5 Hypothesis testing
Multiple regression analysis was used in order to determine main e↵ects and interactions
of the predictors, and to test the two hypotheses presented above. Four separate regres-
sion analyses were conducted, one for each component of trust considered (i.e. perceived
ability, benevolence, integrity, and trusting intentions). Contrast coding was used for
both predictors (Cohen et al., 2003). Accordingly, ‘company response’ was coded  .5 for
apology and +.5 for denial; ‘strength of evidence’ was coded  .5 for weak evidence and
+.5 for strong evidence. With contrast coding, each group’s mean is compared with the
grand mean. Contrast coding was preferred to standard treatment coding because it fa-
cilitates the interpretation of the relative importance of factor levels and of interactions,
as the coding system is designed to represent meaningful di↵erences between means of
given groups or combinations of groups (Cohen et al., 2003: 358). The variable ‘distrust
of corporations’ was treated as a control variable. P values equal to or lower than .05
were considered statistically significant. The complete results of the regression analyses
are presented in Table 4.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that, when evidence of the company’s guilt is weak, denial is
more e↵ective than apology in repairing trust in the accused company. The results of
the regression analyses provide strong support for this hypothesis. As shown in Table 4,
denial had a significant and positive main e↵ect on all the dimensions of trust considered.
As the estimate coe cients reported in Table 4 reveal, denial had the strongest positive
e↵ect on perceived integrity.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that, when evidence against the company is strong, indi-
viduals display more trust in the accused company if the company responded with an
apology rather than a denial. This hypothesis is not supported by the data. A signif-
icant interaction was found between company response and strength of evidence only
for perceived ability and trusting intentions. The negative coe cients of the interaction
terms indicate that the di↵erence between apology and denial significantly decreases with
strong evidence of the company’s guilt. This is in line with our predictions; denial was
Table 3. Number of observations, means, and standard deviations by condition.
Perceived
ability
Perceived
benevolence
Perceived
integrity
Trusting
intentions
N M SD M SD M SD M SD
Weak evidence
Apology 71 3.19 1.10 2.91 1.03 2.44 1.08 2.42 0.95
Denial 70 4.06 1.01 3.22 1.11 3.59 1.06 3.14 1.05
Strong evidence
Apology 68 3.71 1.39 2.79 1.15 2.43 1.13 2.46 0.92
Denial 73 3.70 1.11 3.11 1.07 3.16 1.39 2.61 1.12
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Figure 1: Variable means by experimental condition.
expected to be less e↵ective against strong evidence than against weak evidence of the
company’s guilt, and, conversely, apology was expected to comparatively more e↵ective
in this kind of situation. However, apology does not outperform denial in the strong ev-
idence condition, as originally anticipated. As shown in Table 3, the di↵erence between
mean perceived ability scores for apology and denial is negligible in the strong evidence
condition, and mean trusting intentions scores are actually higher for denial than for
apology. Post-hoc t-tests revealed that these di↵erences are not significant (perceived
ability: t(127.98) = 0.058, p = 0.953; willingness to risk, t(137.03) =  0.876, p = 0.382).
As far as perceived benevolence and perceived integrity are concerned, no significant
interaction was found between company response and strength of evidence. This in-
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dicates that denial significantly outperformed apology in repairing these dimensions of
trust, regardless of the strength of the evidence of the company’s guilt.
Since our sample was not entirely homogenous with respect to the participants’ na-
tionality, we conducted a post-hoc analysis to assess whether this factor had any e↵ect
on the results. We fitted a new regression model for each of the dependent variables,
adding nationality as a predictor. The variable was coded  0.5 for ‘non-Swedish nation-
ality’ and +0.5 for ‘Swedish nationality’. The results show that nationality did not have
a significant e↵ect on any of the dependent variables (Ability:   =  0.15, p = 0.363;
Benevolence:   =  0.01, p = 0.946; Integrity:   =  0.301, p = 0.077; Trusting inten-
tions:   =  0.07, p = 0.630). The   coe cients and p values for the other predictors
remained broadly unchanged. These results indicate that the lack of homogeneity in the
sample with respect to the variable nationality did not a↵ect the results.
Finally, it should be noted that the R2 values were quite low for all models, which
suggests that additional factors that were not considered in this study may have influ-
enced the participants’ responses.
6 Discussion
This study examined the e↵ects of apology and denial in repairing trust in a company
following an integrity-based violation, and sought to determine how the strength of
the evidence of the company’s guilt a↵ects individuals’ responses to these strategies.
The results demonstrate that, when evidence against the company is weak, trust is
restored more successfully with a denial than an apology. The e↵ectiveness of denial
was shown to decrease with strong evidence of the company’s guilt. However, contrary
to our hypothesis, denial was not found to be less e↵ective than apology in this type of
situation. In fact, denial significantly outperformed apology in repairing perceptions of
the company’s integrity and benevolence even in the face of strong evidence, and it was
as e↵ective as apology in restoring perceived ability and trusting intentions.
The finding that, following an integrity-based trust violation and in the absence
of strong evidence of the company’s guilt, denial is more e↵ective than apology is in
line with the results of previous experimental work on trust repair in interpersonal
relations (Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2013, 2004). It indicates that, in this type
of situation, individuals respond to companies’ denials and apologies in a similar way
to how they respond to these verbal strategies when used by other people. Thus, when
confronted with a situation where the trusted parties, people or a companies, deny having
deliberately abused their trust for personal gain, trustors generally seem to be inclined to
give them the benefit of the doubt. This finding provides some empirical support for the
proposition advanced by Poppo and Schepker (2010: 136) that, similar to interpersonal
relationships, a denial is more e↵ective than an apology in repairing organizational trust
following integrity-based violations. It is also consistent with Bradford and Garrett’s
(1995: 880) original hypothesis, which, as presented above, stated that denial is the
most e↵ective strategy in restoring a company’s image in cases where no evidence of its
guilt is provided.
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The greater e↵ectiveness of denial over apology in the absence of strong evidence
of guilt can be explained by di↵erences in the way individuals interpret the signals
conveyed by these verbal responses in di↵erent situations (Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim et al.,
2004). As mentioned above, when assessing other people’s integrity, trustors tend to
give more weight to negative information than to positive information, whereas the
opposite holds when other people’s ability is under scrutiny (see Snyder and Stukas,
1999). As a consequence, following an integrity-based trust violation, the signal of guilt
that an apology conveys (i.e. negative information) overrides the signal of redemption
(i.e. positive information) that the strategy also carries. A denial, then, is comparatively
more e↵ective in this situation because it seeks to disconfirm guilt, and thus to neutralize
negative attributions (Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2004). These dynamics have been
repeatedly observed in dyadic interpersonal relationships. The results of the present
study suggest that the same type of e↵ect also applies to company–stakeholder relations
in situations where the company’s integrity is at stake.
The results obtained under the strong evidence condition failed to confirm our ini-
tial hypothesis and revealed an unanticipated pattern of interaction between company
response and strength of evidence. This outcome appears to be at odds not only with
our second hypothesis, but also with the results of Kim et al. (2004), who found apology
to be more e↵ective than denial when the trust breaker’s guilt was later revealed, and
of Bradford and Garrett (1995), who observed a similar e↵ect in a scenario where the
accusations of corporate wrongdoing were backed by clear evidence.
Several factors may have contributed to this unexpected and apparently counterin-
tuitive result. First of all, the evidence provided may not have been compelling enough
to e↵ectively undermine the credibility of the company’s denial, and trigger suspicion
of deception. Indeed, while evidence of the company’s guilt was perceived as strong by
the participants (M = 4.84, S.D. = 1.38), it was not, on average, taken as conclusive, as
mean ratings in the region of 6 or above would have indicated. Therefore, the accused
company’s denial may have retained at least some degree of credibility or legitimacy in
the eyes of the respondents. Both Kim et al. (2004) and Bradford and Garrett (1995) are
di↵erent in this respect; in these studies, the person’s or company’s guilt was presented
as proven.
Another contributing factor may have been the way in which the company’s denial
was framed in the stimulus material. In the second news article, the company was
reported to have “strongly denied” the allegations. The article also presented a statement
made by a spokesperson in which s/he dismissed the allegations as “groundless”. Such
an absolute and confident denial may have been particularly persuasive, or at least
persuasive enough for it not to be perceived as overly deceitful. Further, the fact that no
justifications or counter-arguments were given possibly limited the participants’ ability
to reflect on and critically assess the veracity of the message. In other words, there was
nothing in the company’s message itself that suggested that they were lying, or that the
participants could have used as a basis to question their assertion.
The results could partly also be explained by culture-specific trust dispositions. As
noted above, the vast majority of the participants were of Swedish nationality. Recent
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international surveys have shown that interpersonal trust in Sweden is among the high-
est in the world (e.g. World Value Survey, 20144). Perhaps more importantly in the
present context, Sweden has among the highest levels of citizen trust in the justice system
(e.g. European Commission’s “Justice in the EU” report, 20135). These culture-specific
dispositions may have influenced the way the respondents reacted to the experimental
scenario and to the company’s denial.6 A large portion of the participants may sponta-
neously have been inclined to be relatively lenient towards the accused company, possibly
based on the belief that justice will ultimately prevail, and therefore the company would
not have had a strong incentive to lie because it would be di cult for them to escape
punishment. In addition to this, Sweden is one of the least corrupt countries in the world
(Uslaner and Badescu, 2004: 32). Accordingly, the allegations of corruption leveled at
a Swedish corporation in the stimulus materials may have been di cult to believe for
some. Admittedly, these explanations are post-hoc and speculative, but they nonetheless
seem plausible given the culture-specific nature of the phenomenon of trust (Saunders
et al., 2010).
More work is needed to clarify what factors contributed to the higher-than-expected
e↵ectiveness of denial against strong evidence of the company’s guilt. Nonetheless, one
clear conclusion can be drawn from the results of this study: denial can be a relatively
e↵ective organizational trust repair strategy, at least in the case of crises of the type
considered here. This finding appears to clash with the results of previous studies in
the domain of crisis communication, where, as detailed above, apology has generally
been found to outperform denial in restoring a company’s image or reputation. This
discrepancy may be explained by considering some important di↵erences between those
studies and the present one.
First of all, as discussed above, most of previous empirical studies have focused on
accidental crises, rather than deliberate acts of wrongdoing. If we equate the former to
ability-based trust violations, the fact that apology was found to outperform denial is
in line with well-established research on trust repair in interpersonal relations (Ferrin
et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2013, 2004), and therefore does not necessarily contradict the
results of our experiment. Our study dealt with an integrity-based violation, for which
current models of interpersonal trust repair predict denial to be a comparatively more
e↵ective strategy. Further, most of previous work in the domain of crisis communication
has investigated constructs such as image or reputation, rather than trust. The type of
patterns observed here might, in fact, be specific to trust.
Another important di↵erence lies in the way in which the company response was
operationalized in previous crisis communication studies. In many instances, complex
multiple strategies, rather than simple apologies and denials, were tested. In one of the
apology scenarios used by Lyon and Cameron (2004: 237–238), for instance, the com-
pany’s ‘apologetic response’ featured, in addition to the confession of guilt and expression
of remorse, an emphatic sympathetic statement by the CEO (“the chemical spill is “like
a nightmare to me””), a disclaimer (the company responsible for the spill had built
their factory next to a river solely in order to contribute to revitalizing the area), and a
statement clarifying that the company did have adequate procedures in place designed
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to prevent chemical spills. Similarly, as noted above, the apologetic response used in
Bradford and Garrett (1995) also included an o↵er of compensation to the victims and
a justification by the company. The denial message tested in Lee (2005) and in Dardis
and Haigh (2009) incorporated blame shifting. It seems plausible, then, to assume that
these additional verbal strategies exerted some influence on the participants; the extent
to which they contributed to the results is, however, unclear.
Finally, as explained above, in several previous studies, concrete evidence of the
company’s responsibility for the crisis was given. As the results of this experiment
show, strength of evidence plays an important role in determining how people respond
to companies’ messages. Accordingly, the presence of hard evidence of the company’s
responsibility in the scenarios used in previous studies may have conditioned participants’
judgments.
One important point that needs to be emphasized is that, while the present study
demonstrates that denial can be a relatively e↵ective trust repair strategy in the im-
mediate aftermath of an integrity-based trust failure, it does not provide any evidence
for the long term e↵ectiveness and viability of this strategy. As noted above, normative
studies on organizational trust repair discourage organizations from taking a defensive
stance towards accusations of wrongdoing, and advocate for an open and transparent
approach instead. Gillespie and Dietz (2009) concede that such an approach might dam-
age an organization’s trustworthiness in the short term, but a defensive approach, they
argue, is even more detrimental in the long haul because it generates uncertainty about
the company’s intentions and future conduct. Along similar lines, Gillespie et al. (2014)
warn against a short-term focus in dealing with trust failures. Based on an in-depth
longitudinal case study, they conclude that an open and cooperative response pays back
in the long run, and ultimately facilitates the process of organizational trust repair and
reintegration. The present study focuses solely on the short-term e↵ects of apology
and denial and therefore does not address the important issue of what the long-term
repercussions of these strategies are. Nevertheless, the study contributes to the debate
over appropriate organizational trust repair strategies by providing empirical evidence
for the ‘paradoxical e↵ect’ that an open and honest attitude can, in the short term, be
more detrimental to organizations than a defensive strategy based on the denial of guilt
(Gillespie and Dietz, 2009: 142).
Clearly, the finding that denial can, at least in the short term, function as a rela-
tively e↵ective trust repair strategy raises the critical concern that this strategy could be
used by blameworthy companies to e↵ectively evade accountability for their wrongdoing.
Organizations often know more than the public about the causes of and responsibilities
for a crisis, and may be incentivized to take advantage of this information imbalance in
order to avoid the legal and financial consequences of a crisis (Tyler, 1997). The fact
that the study focuses on the short-term e↵ects of denial makes the results particularly
troubling in this sense because the immediate post-crisis stage is the most public stage
of a crisis (Dardis and Haigh, 2009: 101). This means that the company’s messages in
this phase are likely to have the broadest and deepest impact on stakeholders’ opinions.
Connected to this, another critical question concerns the possibility that corporations
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take advantage of the insights generated through this study to improve their ability
to strategically manipulate stakeholders’ impressions (cf. Barnett, 2014: 695). In this
sense, it is important to stress that our results should not be interpreted as prescriptive
guidelines. Our primary goal was to shed new light on the mechanisms of organiza-
tional trust repair and on the e↵ects of two fundamental and widely used crisis response
strategies in order to provide an empirical basis to critically assess and question organi-
zations’ communicative practices. In line with Coombs (2007: 165), our stance is that
corporate ethics should always prevail, and that companies should therefore never lie
to stakeholders. Yet, the sheer number of corporate fraud cases that have occurred in
recent years suggests that companies often do, in fact, disregard ethical considerations
and act opportunistically. The results of this study thus bring into sharp relief the need
to raise public awareness about the power of language to serve as a tool for persuasion
and manipulation (Fairclough, 1995), and call for further research into the conditions
that determine the persuasiveness of corporate denial.
7 Limitations and future directions
The results of this study should be interpreted in light of several limitations, which, in
turn, provide opportunities for future research. First, the sample used was restricted
to university students, the majority of which were of Swedish nationality. Additional
research is therefore needed to assess the generalizability of our results. Replications of
this study should be carried out using samples with di↵erent socio-demographic char-
acteristics. More importantly, future studies should include individuals from di↵erent
geographical areas in order to determine whether and to what extent our results gen-
eralize across cultures. As explained above, culture-specific trust dispositions may have
significantly influenced the participants’ responses. More specifically, two factors that we
believe could have played an important role in this regard are generalized interpersonal
trust and trust in the justice system, both of which exhibit substantial cross-country
variation. More research is warranted, then, to test the e↵ects of these variables and,
more generally, to determine what macro-level dispositions a↵ect people’s assessment of
the trustworthiness of individual organizations. Also, qualitative work involving focus
groups, for instance, could throw light upon salient culture-bound aspects that have an
impact on micro-level trusting beliefs and intentions. In sum, as noted by Ferrin et al.
(2007: 905), the investigation of cross-cultural di↵erences in the way individuals respond
to trust violations and subsequent trust repair attempts represents a promising avenue
for future research.
Future extensions of this study might also investigate and compare the responses
of di↵erent stakeholder groups. Pirson and Malhotra (2011) have shown that di↵erent
stakeholders hold di↵erent expectations about the trustworthiness of organizations. In
light of this, it seems reasonable to expect that individuals belonging to di↵erent cate-
gories of stakeholders will react di↵erently to a company’s trust failures and trust repair
messages. The present study has only focused on the general public as a stakeholder
group. Future inquiry could involve additional groups, such as the company’s employees.
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Given the special emphasis employees place on organizational transparency and benev-
olence (Pirson and Malhotra, 2011), apologetic responses might exert a more positive
e↵ect on them compared to our respondents.
Another limitation of this study is that it only tested the e↵ects of one specific type
of denial strategy, which we may term absolute or ‘blanket denial’. As discussed above,
it seems reasonable to assume that the way in which the denial is delivered may a↵ect
the way individuals react to it. While previous work has investigated the comparative
e↵ectiveness of di↵erent formulations of an apology (Fehr and Gelfand, 2010; Hill and
Boyd, 2015), no empirical studies, as far as we know, have examined the e↵ects of
di↵erent denial strategies. To address this question, future work could, for instance, use
Moston and Stephenson’s (2009) typology of denial strategies or similar taxonomies as a
basis for developing experiments designed to assess the relative persuasiveness of a range
of di↵erent types of denial. The form of denial used in the present experiment could be
set against alternative and widely used denial strategies, including, for example, denial
of o↵ense—‘our actions did not violate any of the foreign country’s law’—and denial of
interpretation—‘the executive caught on hidden cameras was not o↵ering a bribe to the
Indian o cial, but only handing him a document’ (Moston and Stephenson, 2009). The
level of assertiveness with which the denial is delivered could also be manipulated. Highly
assertive statements serve to limit opportunities for dialogue and questioning, whereas
tentative claims have the opposite e↵ect of opening up space for discussion (Fuoli and
Paradis, 2014). It would thus be worthwhile to compare the e↵ects of assertive and
tentative denials to determine whether the confidence expressed by the statement has
an e↵ect on its perceived credibility.
As discussed above, evidence of the company’s guilt was perceived by the participants
in this study as strong, but not as unequivocal. This leaves the question open as to where
the ‘tipping point’ for the credibility of companies’ denial is. In other words, how strong
should the evidence against the company be for their denial to be completely ine↵ective
and to raise, rather than ease, people’s skepticism? To address this question, future
studies could incorporate a ‘conclusive evidence’ condition, in order to compare the
e↵ects of the company’s denial vis-a´-vis a broader range of scenarios involving di↵erent
degrees of strength of evidence.
Further, our study considered one specific type of integrity-based violation only,
namely a case of suspected international corruption. Further research is needed to
confirm that the results we obtained apply to all forms of integrity-based organizational
trust failure. Future inquiry should thus consider additional scenarios involving di↵erent
types of integrity-based violations, and also comparisons of integrity-based and ability-
based violations so as to ascertain whether the findings of interpersonal trust repair
studies are indeed compatible with trust violation and repair dynamics in organization–
stakeholder relationships, as our results seem to suggest. This would also allow us
to determine the validity of our explanation for the greater e↵ectiveness of apologies
reported in numerous crisis communication studies.
One additional limitation that should be noted is that this study focuses solely on
the short-term e↵ects of apology and denial on organizational trust. Future work should
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further investigate the long-term consequences and implications for these strategies.
Finally, the relatively low R2 values for all the regression models suggest that more
factors than those considered in this study might play an important role in determining
people’s trust in organizations. One variable that warrants further consideration, we
believe, is trust in the news media. In recent years, news organizations have su↵ered a
significant loss of public trust, due to, among other things, declining reporting standards
triggered by commercial pressures and by the increasingly competitive media environ-
ment, and widely-publicized scandals such as the one involving the now defunct tabloid
News of the World (Fisher, 2016). In light of this, one of the reasons why denial was
relatively e↵ective might have been that the participants were unsure whether to blame
the accused company because they did not fully trust the news story they read. Future
studies could therefore examine how individual beliefs about the credibility of the news
source a↵ect their trust in the company accused of wrongdoing.
In sum, much remains to be discovered about organizational trust repair. We hope
that this study will encourage more research in this important area.
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Notes
1Throughout the paper, the terms ability and competence are treated as synonyms and used
interchangeably. Mayer et al. (1995) favor the term ability, whereas Kim and Harmon (2014)
use the term competence. The way the terms are operationalized, however, is similar.
2Numerous di↵erent definitions of apology have been proposed in the literature. For a review,
see Pace et al. (2010).
3For an overview of the di↵erence between the concepts of image and reputation, the reader
is referred to Barnett et al. (2006).
4Available at: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp [last ac-
cessed: 9 December 2016]
5Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/flash/fl 385 en.pdf [last accessed: 9 De-
cember 2016]
6The fact that no significant di↵erences were found between the Swedish and non-Swedish
sub-samples does not represent reliable counter-evidence to this hypothesis because (i) this study
was not originally designed to assess cross-cultural di↵erences and thus the variable ‘culture’ was
not adequately operationalized, and (ii) the non-Swedish sub-sample is much smaller than the
Swedish one and accounts for over 30 di↵erent nationalities. Therefore, it cannot be taken as a
representative sample of any nationality or culture. Our post-hoc suggestion that culture-specific
trust dispositions may have influenced the results is based on more reliable secondary sources
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such as the 2014 World Value Survey and the 2013 Justice in the EU report by the European
Commission.
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Appendix: Multi-item scales and manipulation checks
Perceived ability (from 1 [strongly disagree] to 7 [strongly agree])
Renergi seems very capable of running a successful business.
I feel very confident about Renergis skills.
I see no reason to doubt Renergis competence.
Perceived benevolence (from 1 [strongly disagree] to 7 [strongly agree])
Renergi seems very concerned about the welfare of people like me.
The needs and desires of people like me seem to be very important to Renergi.
Renergi seems to be interested in the well-being of people like me, not just
themselves.
Perceived integrity (from 1 [strongly disagree] to 7 [strongly agree])
I like Renergis ethical values.
Strict moral principles seem to guide Renergis behavior.
Renergi seems to have a great deal of moral integrity.
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Trusting intentions (from 1 [strongly disagree] to 7 [strongly agree])
Authorities should keep an eye on Renergi.*
Stricter controls should be introduced to ensure that Renergi does not violate
any laws.*
Renergi should be allowed to operate without any direct supervision by the
authorities.
Distrust in multinational corporations (from 1 [strongly disagree] to 7 [strongly agree])
Multinational corporations do not care about acting ethically.
People who run multinational corporations will lie if doing so will increase
company profits.
Multinational corporations do not take responsibility for their actions.
Multinational corporations will break laws if they can make more money
from it.
Manipulation checks (from 1 [strongly disagree] to 7 [strongly agree])
The evidence against Renergi is very strong.
Renergi has admitted to having bribed public o cials to win contracts abroad.
The articles are realistic.
An asterisk indicates reverse-scored items.
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Supplementary materials: Experimental stimuli
Renergi executive (see 
picture). 
The company has yet to 
publicly respond to these 
accusations. 
Swedish energy giant Renergi 
suspected of bribery and corruption 
STOCKHOLM - According to 
Swedish media reports, 
several Renergi executives 
are suspected of bribery. 
Prosecutors allege that 
Renergi's executives paid 
over 50 million dollars in 
bribes to public officials to 
secure lucrative contracts in 
both European and non 
European countries. 
It is believed that the 
executives accused of 
paying bribes were following 
company instructions rather 
than acting on their own. 
T h e h e a d o f  t h e 
prosecution team, Towe 
Petersson, has stated that 
there i s “ver y s t rong 
evidence” against Renergi,  
By SHIRLEY MORELL 
Staff writer 
Friday, February 12, 2016 ! News from the World 
RENERGI executive allegedly offering a bribe to an Indian government official to win 
a 75 million dollar contract to build a new giant solar power plant near New Delhi. 
including hidden-camera 
footage that al legedly 
s h o w s  a n  I n d i a n 
g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l 
accepting a bribe from a 
Text 1: Strong evidence condition
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Renergi. 
The company has yet to 
publicly respond to these 
accusations. 
 
Swedish energy giant Renergi 
suspected of bribery and corruption 
STOCKHOLM - According to 
Swedish media reports, 
several Renergi executives 
are suspected of bribery. 
Prosecutors allege that 
Renergi's executives paid 
over 50 million dollars in 
bribes to public officials to 
secure lucrative contracts in 
both European and non 
European countries. 
It is believed that the 
executives accused of 
paying bribes were following 
company instructions rather 
than acting on their own.  
T h e h e a d o f  t h e 
prosecution team, Towe 
Petersson, has emphasized 
that “the investigation is 
still in its early stages and 
By SHIRLEY MORELL 
Staff writer 
Friday, February 12, 2016 ! News from the World 
GIANT solar power plant built by Renergi near New Delhi, India. The power plant is 
one of several Renergi projects under investigation for alleged bribery. 
no arrests have been made 
at this time”. All the alleged 
recipients of the bribes 
have categorically denied 
receiving any money from 
Text 1: Weak evidence condition
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spokesperson said, adding 
t h a t t h e c o m p a ny i s 
c o m m i t t e d t o t a k i n g 
whatever action is required 
to ensure that this situation 
never arises again. 
Renergi admits to and 
apologizes for paying bribes to 
foreign officials 
STOCKHOLM - In an official 
statement released today, 
Renergi has admitted to 
bribing foreign officials to 
secure lucrative business 
deals.  
Swedish prosecutors 
had presented very strong 
ev i d e n c e a g a i n s t t h e 
company, including video 
footage of alleged bribery 
payments. 
 
Continued on Page 5 
 
Text 2: Strong evidence + apology condition
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By DORI HAYMOND 
“The facts will show that 
these a l legat ions are 
groundless”, a company 
spokesperson said, adding 
that Renergi has always 
adopted a zero-tolerance 
policy towards all forms of 
corruption. 
Renergi denies paying bribes to 
foreign officials 
STOCKHOLM - In an official 
statement released today, 
Renergi has strongly denied 
a l legat ions of br ib ing 
foreign officials to secure 
lucrative business deals, 
d e s p i t e v e r y s t r o n g 
ev i d e n c e a g a i n s t t h e 
company including video 
footage of alleged bribery 
payments. Continued on Page 5 
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has happened”, a company 
spokesperson said, adding 
t h a t t h e c o m p a ny i s 
c o m m i t t e d t o t a k i n g 
whatever action is required 
to ensure that this situation 
never arises again. 
Renergi admits to and 
apologizes for paying bribes to 
foreign officials 
STOCKHOLM - In an official 
statement released today, 
Renergi has admitted to 
bribing foreign officials to 
secure lucrative business 
deals.  
Renergi's admission is 
unexpected. Authorities 
have not provided any 
c o n c r e te ev i d e n c e o f 
Renergi's culpability so far, 
and are still investigating 
the case. Continued on Page 5 
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“The facts will show that 
these a l legat ions are 
groundless”, a company 
spokesperson said, adding 
that Renergi has always 
adopted a zero-tolerance 
policy towards all forms of 
corruption. 
Renergi denies paying bribes to 
foreign officials 
STOCKHOLM - In an official 
statement released today, 
Renergi has strongly denied 
a l legat ions of br ib ing 
foreign officials to secure 
lucrative business deals. 
Authorities have not 
provided any concrete 
ev idence of Renerg i ' s 
culpability so far, and are 
still investigating the case. Continued on Page 5 
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